Working Papers by Colin F. Camerer
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1349 | Quantal Response and Nonequlibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions | Camerer, Colin F. Nunnari, Salvatore Palfrey, Thomas R. | 06/22/2011 | 32 | sswp1349.pdf | ||
1340 | Can Relational Contracts Survive Stochastic Interruptions? | Linardi, Sera Camerer, Colin F. | 06/06/2010 | sswp1340.pdf | |||
1260 | Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies | Camerer, Colin F. Palfrey, Thomas R. Rogers, Brian W. | 12/01/2006 | 36 pages | sswp1260c.pdf | ||
1180 | Aging and decision making: A comparison between neurologically healthy elderly and young individuals | Kovalchik, Stephanie Camerer, Colin F. Grether, David M. Plott, Charles R. Allman, John M. | 05/27/2005 | sswp1180c.pdf | |||
1122 | Economic Value of EWA Lite: A Functional Theory of Learning in Games | Ho, Teck-Hua Camerer, Colin F. Chong, Juin-Kuan | 05/01/2001 | 54 pages | wp1122.pdf | EWA Lite is a one-parameter theory of learning in normal-form games. It approximates the free parameters in an earlier model (EWA) with functions of experience. The theory is tested on seven different games and compared to other learning and equilibrium theories. Either EWA Lite or parameterized EWA predict best, but one kind of reinforcement learning predicts well in games with mixed-strategy equilibrium. Belief learning models fit worst. The economic value of theories is measured by howmuch more subjects would have earned if they followed theory recommendations. EWA Lite and EWA add the most economic value in every game but one. | |
1100 | Strategic Learning and Teaching. | Camerer, Colin F. Ho, Teck-Hua | 08/01/2000 | 23 pages | wp1100.pdf | ||
1098 | EWA Learning in Bilateral Call Markets. | Camerer, Colin F. Hsia, David Ho, Teck-Hua | 08/01/2000 | 34 pages | wp1098.pdf | This chapter extends the EWA learning model to bilateral call market games (also known as the "sealed-bid mechanism" in two-person bargaining). In these games, a buyer and seller independently draw private values from commonly-known distributions and submit bids. If the buyer's bid is above the seller's, they trade at the midpoint of the two bids; otherwise they don't trade. We apply EWA by assuming that players have value-dependent bidding strategies, and they partially generalize experience from one value/cost condition to another in response to the incentives from nonlinear optimal bid functions. The same learning model can be applied to other market institutions where subjects economize on learning by taking into consideration similarity between past experience and a new environment while still recognizing the difference in market incentives between them. The chapter also presents a new application of EWA to a "continental divide" coordination game, and reviews 32 earlier studies comparing EWA, reinforcement, and belief learning. The application shows the advantages of a generalized adaptive model of behavior that includes elements of reinforcement, belief-based and direction learning as special cases at some cost of complexity for the benefit of generality and psychological appeal. It is a good foundation to build upon to extend our understanding of adaptive behavior in more general games and market institutions. In future work, we should investigate the similarity parameters, ψ and ω, to better characterize their magnitude and significance in different market institutions. | |
1087 | Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games. | Camerer, Colin F. Ho, Teck-Hua Chong, Juin-Kuan | 04/01/2000 | sswp1087c.pdf | Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payoff information) and that behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teaching in repeated games. The generalized model assumes that there is a mixture of adaptive learners and sophisticated players. Like before, an adaptive learner adjusts his behavior the EWA way. A sophisticated player however does not learn and rationally best-responds to her forecasts of all other behaviors. A sophisticated player can be either myopic or foresighted. A foresighted player develops multiple-period rather than single-period forecasts of others' behaviors and chooses to 'teach' the other players by choosing a strategy scenario that gives her the highest discounted net present value. Consequently a foresighted player can develop a reputation for herself by strategic teaching if she is matched with an adaptive player repeatedly. We estimate the model using data fromp-beauty contests and repeated entry-deterrence (chain-store) games. Overall, the results show that the generalized model is better than the adaptive EWA model in describing and predicting behavior. Including teaching also allows an empirical learning-based approach to reputation formation which is at least as plausible as the now-standard type-based approach, and is superior in predictive performance in four different ways. | ||
1080 | Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination | Camerer, Colin F. Knez, Marc | 01/01/2000 | 38 pages | wp1080.pdf | ||
1060 | Information Aggregation in Experimental Asset Markets: Traps and Misaligned Beliefs | Noeth, Markus Camerer, Colin F. Plott, Charles R. Webber, Martin | 04/01/1999 | wp1060.pdf | The capacity of markets to aggregate information has been conclusively demonstrated but the limitations of that capacity have still not been fully explored. In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of "information traps". These traps appear to be a sort of equilibrium in which information existing in the market does not become revealed in prices. The foundation for the equilibrium is a pattern of misaligned beliefs in which each person's actions are based upon mistaken beliefs about the information held by others. The mistakes, themselves, have a type of mutual compatibility and cannot become revealed by the price discovery process because individuals have no incentives or resources to adjust. Attempts to probe the nature of the phenomena involved two period markets with a contingent claim instrument, experienced participants, and unlimited short selling opportunities. | ||
1059 | The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework | Camerer, Colin F. Hogarth, Robin M. | 04/01/1999 | 43 pages | wp1059.pdf | ||
1058 | Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-Receiver Signaling Games | Anderson, Christopher M. Camerer, Colin F. | 03/01/1999 | 34 pages | wp1058.pdf | Recent experiments have indicated that it is possible to systematically lead subjects to less refined equilibria in signaling games. In this paper, we seek to understand the process by which this occurs using Camerer and Ho's Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) model of learning in games. We first adapt the model to extensive-form signaling games by specifying that senders update the chosen message for both the realized and unrealized type, but do not update the unchosen message. We test this model against the choice reinforcement and belief-based special cases of EWA; the latter is of particular interest because it formalizes the story about convergence to less refined equilibria offered by Brandts and Holt. We also test a variety of models which update unchosen messages. We find that while the Brandts-Holt story captures the the direction of switching from one strategy to another, it does not do a good job at capturing the rate at which the switching occurs. EWA does quite well at predicting the rate of switching, and is slightly bettered by the unchosen message models, which all perform equally well. | |
1043 | The Econometrics and Behavioral Economics of Escalation of Commitment: A Re-examination of Staw and Hoang's NBA Data | Camerer, Colin F. Weber, Roberto A. | 08/01/1998 | 25 pages | wp1043.pdf | We examine the phenomenon of escalation from an economist's perspective, emphasizing explanations which do not rule out rational behavior on the part of firms or agents. We argue that escalation cannot be established as a separate phenomenon unless these possible alternative explanations are properly accounted for. We present Staw and Hoang's (1995) study of NBA data as an instance of where evidence of escalation might be overturned upon more careful analysis. After performing several tests of our alternative explanations, we find that evidence of escalation persists, although it is weaker both in duration and magnitude. | |
1040 | Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining | Johnson, Eric J. Camerer, Colin F. Sen, Sankar Rymon, Talia | 06/01/1998 | 38 pages | wp1040.pdf | We ran three-round sequential bargaining experiments in which the perfect equilibrium offer was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.50. Subjects offered $2.11 to other subjects, $1.84 to "robot" players (who are known to play subgame perfectly), and $1.22 to robots after instruction in backward induction. Measures of information search showed that subjects did not look at the amounts being divided in different rounds in the correct order, and for the length of time, necessary for backward induction, unless they were specifically instructed. The results suggest that most of the departure from perfect equilibrium is due to limited computation and some is due to fairness. | |
1037 | Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence From the Field | Camerer, Colin F. | 05/01/1998 | 14 pages | sswp1037c.pdf | ||
1029 | Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Making | Camerer, Colin F. | 03/01/1998 | 29 pages | wp1029.pdf | My goals in this paper are: (i) To give a pithy, opinionated summary of what has been learned about bounded rationality in individual decision making from experiments in economics and psychology (drawing on my 1995 Handbook of Experimental Economics chapter); and (ii) mention some promising new directions for research which would be included if that chapter were written today. | |
1004 | Progress and Behavioral Game Theory | Camerer, Colin F. | 09/01/1997 | 22 pages | sswp1004c.pdf | Is game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not? It is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely ignoring this question. The seminal book by von Neumann and Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, was clearly about how rational players would play against others they knew were rational. In more recent work, game theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise. At one extreme, highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions. At the other extreme, adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple models-mostly developed to describe nonhuman animals-in which players may not realize they are playing a game at all. When game theory does aim to describe behavior, it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing. | |
1003 | Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: A Unifying Approach | Camerer, Colin F. Ho, Teck-Hua | 03/01/1997 | 42 pages | wp1003.pdf | We describe a general model, 'experience-weighted attraction' (EWA) learning, which includes reinforcement learning and a class of weighted fictitious play belief models as special cases. In EWA, strategies have attractions which reflect prior predispositions, are updated based on payoff experience, and determine choice probabilities according to some rule (e.g., logit). A key feature is a parameter δ which weights the strength of hypothetical reinforcement of strategies which were not chosen according to the payoff they would have yielded. When δ = 0 choice reinforcement results. When δ = 1, levels of reinforcement of strategies are proportional to expected payoffs given beliefs based on past history. Another key feature is the growth rates of attractions. The EWA model controls the growth rates by two decay parameters, φ and ρ, which depreciate attractions and amount of experience separately. When φ = ρ belief-based models result; when ρ = 0 choice reinforcement results. Using three data sets, parameter estimates of the model were calibrated on part of the data and used to predict the rest. Estimates of δ are generally around .50, φ around 1, and ρ varies from 0 to φ. Choice reinforcement models often outperform belief-based models in the calibration phase and underperform in out-of-sample validation. Both special cases are generally rejected in favor of EWA, though sometimes belief models do better. EWA is able to combine the best features of both approaches, allowing attractions to begin and grow exibly as choice reinforcement does, but reinforcing unchosen strategies substantially as belief-based models implicitly do. | |
992 | The Illusion of Leadership | Weber, Roberto A. Camerer, Colin F. Knez, Marc | 12/01/1996 | ||||
983 | Can Asset Markets be Manipulated? A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting | Camerer, Colin F. | 09/01/1996 | sswp983c.pdf | |||
975 | Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach | Lovallo, Dan Camerer, Colin F. | 07/01/1996 | sswp975c.pdf | |||
974 | Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental P-Beauty Contests | Ho, Teck-Hua Weigelt, Keith Camerer, Colin F. | 07/01/1996 | sswp974c.pdf | |||
970 | Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games | Camerer, Colin F. Knez, Marc Weber, Roberto A. | 05/01/1996 | sswp970.pdf | |||
960 | Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day At A time | Camerer, Colin F. Babcock, Linda Loewenstein, George Thaler, Richard | 04/01/1996 | sswp960c.pdf | |||
946 | Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ | Camerer, Colin F. | 12/01/1995 | sswp946c.pdf | |||
937 | Loss Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games | Cachon, Gerard P. Camerer, Colin F. | 08/01/1995 | sswp937c.pdf | |||
920 | Outside Options and Social Comparison in 3-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments | Knez, Marc Camerer, Colin F. | 04/01/1995 | ||||
740 | An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games. | Banks, Jeffrey S. Camerer, Colin F. Porter, David P. | 06/01/1990 | sswp740c.pdf |