Working Papers by Han Seo
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
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1442 | Fake News, Information Herds, Cascades and Economic Knowledge | Butkovich, Lazarina Butkovich, Nina Plott, Charles R. Seo, Han | 03/21/2019 | 24 | sswp1442.pdf | The paper addresses the issue of “fake news” through a well-known and widely studied experiment that illustrates a possible science behind the phenomenon. Public news is viewed as an aggregation of decentralized pieces of valuable information about complex events. Such systems rely on accumulated investment in trust in news sources. In the case of fake news, news source reliability is not known. The experiment demonstrates how fake news can destroy both the investment in trust and also the benefits that news provides. | |
1435 | Tick Size, Price Grids and Market Performance: Stable Matches as a Model of Market Dynamics and Equilibrium | Plott, Charles R. Roll, Richard Seo, Han Zhao, Hao | 01/08/2018 | 58 | sswp1435_r_X1x1ZD3.pdf | This paper reports experiments motivated by ongoing controversies regarding tick size in markets. The minimum tick size in a market dictates discrete values at which bids and asks can be tendered by market participants. All transaction prices must occur at these discrete values, which are established by the rules of each exchange. The simplicity of experiments helps to distinguish among competing models of complex real-world securities markets. We observe patterns predicted by a matching (cooperative game) model. Because a price grid damages the equilibrium of the competitive model, the matching model provides predictions where the competitive model cannot; their predictions are the same when a competitive equilibrium exists. The experiment examines stable allocations, average prices, timing of order flow and price dynamics. Larger tick size invites more speculation, which in turn increases liquidity. However, increased speculation leads to inefficient trades that otherwise would not have occurred. | |
1432 | A Testbed Experiment of a (Smart) Marked Based, Student Transportation Policy: Non Convexities, Coordination, Non Existence | Lee, Hsing Yang Maron, Travis Plott, Charles R. Seo, Han | 01/11/2018 | 41 | sswp1432.pdf | The paper develops and studies a decentralized mechanism for pricing and allocation challenges typically met with administrative processes. Traditional forms of markets are not used due to conditions associated with market failure, such as complex coordination problems, thin markets, non-convexities including and zero marginal cost due to lumpy transportation capacities. The mechanism rests on an assignment process that is guided by a computational process, enforces rules and channels information feedback to participants. Special, testbed experimental methods produce high levels of efficiency when confronted by individual behaviors that are consistent with traditional models of strategic behavior. |