Working Papers by Andrea Mattozzi
Showing 1 to 5 of 5 records.
| # | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1319 | The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections | Iaryczower, Matias Mattozzi, Andrea | 03/03/2010 | sswp1319.pdf | |||
| 1285 | On the nature of competition in alternative lectoral systems (Formally "Ideology and competence in alternative electoral systems | Iaryczower, Matias Mattozzi, Andrea | 08/01/2009 | 36 pages | sswp1285RR.pdf | ||
| 1229 | Policy uncertainty, electoral securities and redistribution | Mattozzi, Andrea | 06/01/2005 | 32 pages | wp1229.pdf | ||
| 1207 | Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. Stock Market | Mattozzi, Andrea | 10/01/2004 | 17 pages | wp1207-2.pdf | We show that existing stocks that are currently traded in the U.S. stock market can be used to hedge political uncertainty. Focusing on the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, we construct two "presidential portfolios" composed of selected stocks anticipated to fare differently under a Bush versus a Gore presidency. To construct these portfolios we use data on campaign contributions by publicly traded corporations and identify the major contributors on each side. Using daily observations for the six months before the election took place, we show that the excess returns of these portfolios with respect to overall market movements are significantly related to changes in electoral polls. | |
| 1206 | Membership in Citizen Groups | Barbieri, Stefano Mattozzi, Andrea | 10/01/2004 | 28 pages | wp1206.pdf | We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods. |