Working Papers by Brian W. Rogers
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1363 | Symmetric play in repeated allocation games | Kuzmics, Christoph Palfrey, Thomas R. Rogers, Brian W. | 07/05/2012 | sswp1363.pdf | |||
1260 | Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies | Camerer, Colin F. Palfrey, Thomas R. Rogers, Brian W. | 12/01/2006 | 36 pages | sswp1260c.pdf | ||
1239 | Divergence and Convergence in Scarf Cycle Environments: Experiments and Predictability in the Dynamics of General Equilibrium Systems | Gillen, Benjamin J. Hirota, Masayoshi Hsu, Ming Plott, Charles R. Rogers, Brian W. | 10/01/2005 | 57 pages | sswp_1239_-_revised_v.2.pdf | Previous experimental work demonstrates the power of classical theories of economic dynamics to accurately characterize equilibration in multiple market systems. Building on the literature, this study examines the behavior of experimental continuous double auction markets in convergence-challenging environments identified by Scarf (1960) and Hirota (1981). The experiments provide insight into two important economic questions: (a) do markets necessarily converge to a unique interior equilibrium? and (b) which model, among a set of classical specifications, most accurately characterizes observed price dynamics? We observe excess demand driven prices spiraling outwardly away from the interior equilibrium prices as predicted by the theory of disequilibrium price dynamics. We estimate a structural model establishing that partial equilibrium dynamics characterize price changes even in an unstable general equilibrium environment. We observe linkages between excess demand in one market and price changes in another market but the sign of expected price change in a market does not depend on the magnitude of excess demand in other markets unless disequilibrium is severe. Original working paper published October 2005. | |
1216 | Search in the formation of large networks: How random are socially generated networks? | Jackson, Matthew O. Rogers, Brian W. | 03/01/2005 | 46 pages | wp1216.pdf | ||
1214 | The economics of small worlds | Jackson, Matthew O. Rogers, Brian W. | 03/01/2005 | 10 pages | wp1214.pdf | ||
1197 | Self-correcting Information Cascades | Goeree, Jacob K. Palfrey, Thomas R. Rogers, Brian W. McKelvey, Richard D. | 04/01/2004 | 41 pages | wp1197.pdf | In laboratory experiments, information cascades are ephemeral phenomena, collapsing soon after they form, and them reforming again. The formation/collapse/reformation cycles occur frequently and repeatedly. Cascades may be reversed (collapse followed by a cascade on a different state) and more often than not, such a reversal is self-correcting: The cascade switches from the incorrect to the correct state. Past experimental work focused on relatively short horizons, where these interesting dynamics are rarely observed. We present experiments with a longer horizon, and also investigate the effect of signal informativeness. We propose a theoretical model, based on quantal response equilibrium, where temporary and self-correcting cascades arise as equilibrium phenomena. The model also predicts the systematic differences we observe experimentally in the dynamics, as a function of signal informativeness. We extend the basic model to include a parameter measuring base rate neglect and find it to be a statistically significant factor in the dynamics, resulting in somewhat faster rates of social learning. | |
1187 | Social learning with private and common values | Goeree, Jacob K. Palfrey, Thomas R. Rogers, Brian W. | 11/01/2003 | 29 pages | sswp1187c.pdf | We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result for pure common-value environments where the state is 'never' learned, resulting in herds or informational cascades. The medium run dynamics to convergence can be very complex and non-monotone: posterior beliefs may be concentrated on a wrong state for a long time, shifting suddenly to the correct state. |