Working Papers by Enriqueta Aragones
Showing 1 to 4 of 4 records.
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
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1258 | Political reputations and campaign promises | Aragones, Enriqueta Palfrey, Thomas R. Postlewaite, Andrew | 12/01/2006 | 78 pages | sswp1258.pdf | ||
1169 | Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information | Aragones, Enriqueta Palfrey, Thomas R. | 05/01/2003 | 21 pages | sswp1169c.pdf | This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero. | |
1138 | The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study | Aragones, Enriqueta Palfrey, Thomas R. | 06/01/2002 | sswp1138c.pdf | |||
1102 | Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate | Aragones, Enriqueta Palfrey, Thomas R. | 09/01/2000 | 40 pages | sswp1102c.pdf | This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance δ. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about δ and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies. |