Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Seminar in Political Economy

McMurray will present his latest paper, "Polarization and Pandering in Common-value Elections."

Abstract: "Standard election models robustly predict that candidates should adopt moderate policies, especially if they value winning office, and that this is good for voter welfare. Empirical polarization is therefore both inexplicable and troubling. This paper shows that if voter differences reflect beliefs about an underlying truth variable, rather than idiosyncratic preferences, then polarization is the robust equilibrium prediction, even when the value of winning is high, as both sides claim superiority. Moderation can then be undesirable, as a spatial form of pandering to popular opinion, though the greater danger is over-extremism, which can result from overconfidence. Standard election models robustly predict that candidates should adopt moderate policies, especially if they value winning office, and that this is good for voter welfare. Empirical polarization is therefore both inexplicable and troubling. This paper shows that if voter differences reflect beliefs about an underlying truth variable, rather than idiosyncratic preferences, then polarization is the robust equilibrium prediction, even when the value of winning is high, as both sides claim superiority. Moderation can then be undesirable, as a spatial form of pandering to popular opinion, though the greater danger is over-extremism, which can result from overconfidence."