Social Science Job Candidate

We present an incomplete information model of two-stage electoral competition in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but rather infer the candidates' ideological types from signals made during the campaign (debates, speeches, etc.), where a bigger number of signals corresponds to a higher intensity campaign. This model captures two commonly observed patterns: (1) the "post-primary moderation effect," in which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center once the nomination is secured, and (2) the "divisive-primary effect," which refers to the detrimental effect of intense primaries on a party's general-election prospects. We test model's predictions in the controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental results indicate that primary voters and candidates understand the trade-o¤s of two-stage elections and behave in a manner that is consistent with the theoretical predictions. Moreover, intense primaries drive moderate candidates out of the competition in the nomination stage. This model also generates a new empirical prediction: intense primaries tend to elect extreme candidates, while intense general elections tend to elect moderate ones. Preliminary results from the U.S. House races in 1998 support this prediction.