Working Papers by Anthony M. Kwasnica
Showing 1 to 4 of 4 records.
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1136 | Information Aggregation in Double Auctions: Rational Expectations and the Winner's Curse | Guarnaschelli, Serena Kwasnica, Anthony M. Plott, Charles R. | 06/01/2002 | wp1136.pdf | |||
1054 | A New and Improved Design For Multi-Object Iterative Auctions | DeMartini, Christine Kwasnica, Anthony M. Ledyard, John O. Porter, David P. | 11/01/1998 | 39 pages | sswp1054c.pdf | In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Milgrom FCC design (see Milgrom (1995)) and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989)). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. We are able to demonstrate, in both simple and complex environments, that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem. | |
1045 | The Design of Multi-Object Multi-Round Auction | Kwasnica, Anthony M. Ledyard, John O. Porter, David P. Scott, Julie | 11/01/1998 | sswp1045c.pdf | |||
1010 | Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and Experiments | Kwasnica, Anthony M. | 03/01/1998 | 58 pages | wp1010r1.pdf | The choice of strategies by bidders who are allowed to communicate in auctions is studied. Using the tools of mechanism design, the possible outcomes of communication between bidders participating in a series of simultaneous first-price auctions are investigated. A variety of mechanisms are incentive compatible when side payments are not allowed. When attention is restricted to mechanisms that rely only on bidders' ordinal ranking of markets, incentive compatibility ischaracterized and the ranking mechanism of Pesendorfer (1996) is interim incentive efficient. Laboratory experiments were completed to investigate the existence, stability, and effect on bidder and seller surplus of cooperative agreements in multiple object simultaneous first-price auctions. Collusive agreements stable in the laboratory. The choices of the experimental subjects often closely match the choices predicted by the ranking and serial dictator mechanisms presented earlier. However, a few notable exceptions raise interesting prospects for the theoretical development of models of cooperative behavior. |