Working Papers by Timothy N. Cason
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1447 | General Equilibrium Methodology Applied to the Design, Implementation and Performance Evaluation of Large, Multi-Market and Multi-Unit Policy Constrained Auctions | Plott, Charles R. Cason, Timothy N. Gillen, Benjamin J. Lee, Hsing Yang Maron, Travis | 01/13/2022 | 62 | sswp1447_revJAN2022.pdf | The paper reports on the methodology, design and outcome of a large auction with multiple, interdependent markets constructed from principles of general equilibrium as opposed to game theoretic auction theory. It distributed 18,788 entitlements to operate electronic gaming machines in 176 interconnected markets to 363 potential buyers representing gaming establishments subject to multiple policy constraints on the allocation. The multi-round auction, conducted in one day, produced over $600M in revenue. All policy constraints were satisfied. Revealed dynamics of interim allocations and new statistical tests provide evidence of multiple market convergence hypothesized by classical theories of general equilibrium. Results support the use of computer supported, "tâtonnement–like" market adjustments as a reliable empirical processes and not as purely theoretical constructs. | |
1364 | Misconceptions and game form recognition: Challenges to theories of revealed preference and framing (Revised) | Cason, Timothy N. Plott, Charles R. | 09/10/2012 | 40 | SSRN_Cason_Plott_Misconceptions_20140818.pdf | This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and non-standard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing, can masquerade as having been produced by non-standard preferences. | |
1202 | Forced information disclosure and the fallacy of transparency in markets | Cason, Timothy N. Plott, Charles R. | 06/01/2004 | 32 pages | sswp1202c.pdf | A theory advanced in regulatory hearings holds that market performance will be improved if one side of the market is forced to publicly reveal preferences. For example, wholesale electricity producers claim that retail electricity consumers would pay lower prices if wholesale public utility demand is disclosed to producers. Experimental markets studied here featured decentralized, privately negotiated contracts, typical of the wholesale electricity markets. Two conclusions emerge: (i) such markets generally converge to the competitive equilibrium and (ii) forced disclosure works to the disadvantage of the disclosing side. Information disclosure would result in higher wholesale and thus higher retail electricity prices | |
1165 | Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work? | Cason, Timothy N. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi Sjostrom, Tomas Yamato, Takehiko | 05/01/2003 | 50 pages | wp1165.pdf | ||
1154 | Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments | Saijo, Tatsuyoshi Yamato, Takehiko Yokotani, Konomu Cason, Timothy N. | 12/01/2002 | wp1154.pdf | |||
863 | EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation | Cason, Timothy N. Plott, Charles R. | 09/13/2012 | sswp863orig.pdf |