Working Papers by Matthew O. Jackson
Showing 1 to 39 of 39 records.
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
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1264 | Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games | Jackson, Matthew O. Yariv, Leeat | 10/01/2006 | 24 pages | sswp1264.pdf | ||
1251 | Diffusion on social networks | Jackson, Matthew O. Yariv, Leeat | 03/01/2006 | 16 pages | sswp1251c.pdf | ||
1250 | Nomination processes and policy outcomes | Jackson, Matthew O. Mathevet, Laurent Mattes, Kyle | 03/01/2006 | 25 pages | sswp1250c.pdf | ||
1247 | Political bias and war | Jackson, Matthew O. Morelli, Massimo | 01/01/2006 | 26 pages | wp1247.pdf | ||
1242 | Like father, like son: Social networks, human capital investment, and social mobility | Calvo-Armengol, Antoni Jackson, Matthew O. | 11/01/2005 | 29 pages | wp1242.pdf | We build a model where an individual sees higher returns to investments in human capital when their neighbors in a social network have higher levels of human capital. We show that the correlation of human capital across generations of a given family is directly related to the sensitivity of individual investment decisions to the state of the social network. Increasing the sensitivity leads to increased intergenerational correlation, as well as more costly investment decisions on average in the society. We calibrate a simple threshold version of the model to data from a variety of EU nations. We also show how directly analyzing sensitivity of decisions to social circumstances can lead to information that is not captured by intergenerational correlation. | |
1241 | Non-Existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-Price, and English | Jackson, Matthew O. | 11/01/2005 | 8 pages | wp1241.pdf | A simple example shows that equilibria can fail to exist in second price (Vickrey) and English auctions when there are both common and private components to bidders' valuations and private information is held on both dimensions. The example shows that equilibrium only exists in the extremes of pure private and pure common values, and that existence in standard models is not robust to a slight perturbation. | |
1237 | The economics of social networks | Jackson, Matthew O. | 08/01/2005 | 86 pages | sswp1237c.pdf | The science of social networks is a central field of sociological study, a major application of random graph theory, and an emerging area of study by economists, statistical physicists and computer scientists. While these literatures are (slowly) becoming aware of each other, and on occasion drawing from one another, they are still largely distinct in their methods, interests, and goals. Here, my aim is to provide some perspective on the research from these literatures, with a focus on the formal modeling of social networks and the two major types of models: those based on random graphs and those based on game theoretic reasoning. I highlight some of the strengths, weaknesses, and potential synergies between these two network modeling approaches. | |
1216 | Search in the formation of large networks: How random are socially generated networks? | Jackson, Matthew O. Rogers, Brian W. | 03/01/2005 | 46 pages | wp1216.pdf | ||
1215 | Vote buying | Jackson, Matthew O. Dekel, Eddie Wolinsky, Asher | 03/01/2005 | 37 pages | sswp1215.pdf | ||
1214 | The economics of small worlds | Jackson, Matthew O. Rogers, Brian W. | 03/01/2005 | 10 pages | wp1214.pdf | ||
1213 | Networks in labor markets: Wage & employment dynamics & inequality | Calvo-Armengol, Antoni Jackson, Matthew O. | 03/01/2005 | 19 pages | sswp1213c.pdf | ||
1212 | Social Games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games | Jackson, Matthew O. Watts, Alison | 03/01/2005 | 47 pages | wp1212.pdf | We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative populations of players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding fixed-player repeated games. We explore existence under different equilibrium definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. | |
1196 | On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union | Barbera, Salvador Jackson, Matthew O. | 04/01/2004 | 29 pages | sswp1196c.pdf | Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model, and compare them to the weights derived from poll data. | |
1195 | The Banks Set & the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems | Dutta, Bhaskar Jackson, Matthew O. Le Breton, Michel | 05/01/2004 | sswp1195c.pdf | |||
1194 | The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players | Bloch, Francis Jackson, Matthew O. | 04/01/2004 | 39 pages | sswp1194c.pdf | We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link formation. One aspect is whether players can only make and receive transfers to other players to whom they are directly linked, or whether they can also subsidize links that they are not directly involved in. Another aspect is whether or not transfers related to a given link can be made contingent on the full resulting network or only on the link itself. A final aspect is whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects is related either to accounting for a specific type of externality, or to dealing with the combinatorial nature of network payoffs. | |
1193 | Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation | Charness, Gary Jackson, Matthew O. | 05/01/2004 | 50 pages | wp1193.pdf | We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find that that the structure of the voting rule completely determines which equilibrium is played, independently of the payoff structure. Thus, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play our games, with payoffs playing a much more important role in equilibrium selection in the latter case. We also explore play between groups where one member of each group dictates the play of that group. We find that the dictator tends to play a less risky strategy when choosing for a group than when playing only for him or herself. We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments. | |
1192 | Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions | Jackson, Matthew O. Swinkels, Jeroen M. | 03/01/2004 | 51 pages | sswp1192c.pdf | We show existence of equilibria in istributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions, including the first general existence result for double auctions. The set of quilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit demands, all standard pricing rules, reserve prices, entry costs, and stochastic demand and supply. Valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed. For double auctions, we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of trade. The existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for discontinuous Bayesian games. | |
1191 | On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions | Jackson, Matthew O. Kremer, Ilan | 01/01/2004 | 12 pages | sswp1191c.pdf | We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory price auctions where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. Bidders observe private signals that are affiliated with the common value. We show that the average price in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. In particular, we show that conditional on relatively low signals, bidders bid the expected value of the objects conditional n their information and winning; while bids at higher signals flatten out and are below the expected value conditional on winning. | |
1190 | The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment | Jackson, Matthew O. Kremer, Ilan | 01/01/2004 | 28 pages | sswp1190c.pdf | We examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by analyzing and comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders. We show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders, then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue. When the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders, then the particulars of the auction format matter. All equilibria of the uniform auction are efficient while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction are inefficient. The relative revenue rankings of the auction formats can go in either direction, depending on the specifics of the environment. | |
1161 | A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency | Jackson, Matthew O. | 03/01/2003 | 56 pages | wp1161.pdf | I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibitily of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links. | |
1160 | Allocation Rules for Network Games | Jackson, Matthew O. | 03/01/2003 | 33 pages | sswp1160c.pdf | Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value. | |
1159 | The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency | Jackson, Matthew O. Sonnenschein, Hugo F. | 03/01/2003 | wp1159.pdf | |||
1157 | Envy-Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies | Jackson, Matthew O. Kremer, Ilan | 02/01/2003 | wp1157.pdf | |||
1152 | Equilibrium Agenda Formation | Jackson, Matthew O. Dutta, Bhaskar Le Breton, Michel | 11/01/2002 | 39 | sswp1152.pdf | We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any proto col. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known "chaos" theorems. | |
1151 | Postcards from the NSF | Jackson, Matthew O. Razzolini, Laura | 11/01/2002 | wp1151.pdf | |||
1150 | Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players | Wilkie, Simon Jackson, Matthew O. | 11/01/2002 | sswp1150c.pdf | |||
1149 | Social Networks in Determing Employment and Wages: Patterns, Dynamics, and Inequality | Jackson, Matthew O. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni | 11/01/2002 | wp1149.pdf | |||
1148 | The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods Under Congestion and Crowding Preferences | Jackson, Matthew O. Nicolo, Antonio | 11/01/2002 | sswp1148c.pdf | |||
1147 | Strongly Stable Networks | Jackson, Matthew O. van den Nouweland, Anne | 11/01/2002 | sswp1147c.pdf | |||
1146 | On the Concentration of Allocations and Comparisons of Auctions in Large Economies | Jackson, Matthew O. Kremer, Ilan | 11/01/2002 | wp1146.pdf | |||
1145 | Choosing How Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules | Jackson, Matthew O. Barbera, Salvador | 11/01/2002 | sswp1145c.pdf | |||
1144 | Categorical Cognition: A Psychological Model of Categories and Identification in Decision Making | Jackson, Matthew O. Fryer Jr., Roland G. | 11/01/2002 | wp1144.pdf | |||
1077 | Voluntary Implementation | Jackson, Matthew O. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 11/01/1999 | 31 pages | sswp1077c.pdf | We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The first approach is static where a state-contingent participation constraint de nes an implicit mapping from rejected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We call this voluntary implementation, and show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is not voluntarily implementable. The second approach is dynamic where a mechanism is replayed if the outcome at any stage is vetoed by one of the agents. We call this stationary implementation, and show that if players discount the future in any way, then the constrained Walrasian correspondence is stationarily implementable. | |
1076 | A Crash Course in Implementation Theory | Jackson, Matthew O. | 07/01/1999 | 61 pages | sswp1076c.pdf | These lectures are meant to familiarize the audience with some of the fundamental results in the theory of implementation and provide a quick progression to some open questions in the literature. | |
1075 | Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions and Discontinuous Bayesian Games: Endogenous and Incentive Compatibility Sharing Rules | Jackson, Matthew O. Swinkels, Jeroen M. | 11/01/1999 | 54 pages | wp1075.pdf | We consider discontinuous games with incomplete information. Auctions are a leading example. With standard tie breaking rules (or more generally, sharing rules), these games may not have equilibria. We consider sharing rules that depend on the private information of players. We show that there exists an equilibrium of an augmented game with an incentive compatible sharing rule in which players reveal their private information for the purpose of determining sharing. We also show that for a large class of private value auctions, ties never occur in the equilibrium of the augmented game. This establishes existence of equilibria in such auctions with standard tie breaking rules. | |
1044 | The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks | Jackson, Matthew O. | 09/01/1998 | 44 pages | sswp1044c.pdf | We examine the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks connecting individuals whose payoffs from an economic or social activity depends on the network structure in place. Over time, individuals form and sever links connecting themselves to other individuals based on the improvement the resulting network offers them relative to the current network. Such a process creates a sequence of networks that we call an 'improving path'. The changes made along an improving path make the individuals, who added or deleted the relevant link(s) at each date, better off. Such sequences of networks can cycle, and we study conditions on underlying allocation rules that characterize cycles. Building on an understanding of improving paths, we consider a stochastic evolutionary process where in addition to intended changes in the network there is a small probability of unintended changes or errors. Predictions can be made regarding the relative likelihood that the stochastic evolutionary process will lead to any given network at some time. The evolutionary process selects from among the statically stable networks and cycles. We show that in some cases, the evolutionary process selects inefficient networks even though eÆcient ones are statically stable. We apply these results to the matching literature to show that there are contexts in which the evolutionarily stable networks coincide with the core stable networks, and thus achieve effciency. | |
1036 | Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game | Jackson, Matthew O. Moselle, Boaz | 05/01/1998 | 34 pages | sswp1036c.pdf | We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions, and legislators' preferences are separable over the two dimensions. In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together, rather than offering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately. The equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator (as defined over the ideological dimension), in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made. Moreover, in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved. We show that legislators can gain from forming political parties, and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties. We discuss the impact of political parties on the outcome. | |
985 | Dynamic Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining | Jackson, Matthew O. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 10/01/1996 | sswp985c.pdf | |||
754 | Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism. | Jackson, Matthew O. Palfrey, Thomas R. Srivastava, Sanjay | 11/01/1990 | sswp754.pdf |