Working Papers by Jeffrey S. Banks
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1163 | A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games | Banks, Jeffrey S. Duggan, John | 05/01/2003 | 21 pages | sswp1163c.pdf | We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed. | |
1162 | A bargaining model of legislative policy-making | Banks, Jeffrey S. Duggan, John | 05/01/2003 | 43 pages | sswp1162.pdf | ||
1053 | A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice | Banks, Jeffrey S. Duggan, John | 02/01/1999 | sswp1053c.pdf | |||
892 | An Experimental Analysis of the Two-Armed Bandit Program | Banks, Jeffrey S. Olson, Mark Porter, David P. | 10/01/1994 | sswp892c.pdf | |||
740 | An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games. | Banks, Jeffrey S. Camerer, Colin F. Porter, David P. | 06/01/1990 | sswp740c.pdf | |||
680 | Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources. | Banks, Jeffrey S. Ledyard, John O. Porter, David P. | 08/15/2013 | sswp680c.pdf | |||
648 | The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources. | Banks, Jeffrey S. Ledyard, John O. Porter, David P. | 06/01/1987 | ||||
643 | Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes. | Austen-Smith, David Banks, Jeffrey S. | 05/01/1987 | sswp643c.pdf | |||
608 | Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlememt. | Banks, Jeffrey S. | 03/01/1986 | ||||
603 | Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees. | Banks, Jeffrey S. Gasmi, Farid | 03/01/1986 | ||||
595 | An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity. | Banks, Jeffrey S. Plott, Charles R. Porter, David P. | 01/23/2013 | sswp595c.pdf | |||
565 | Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games. | Banks, Jeffrey S. Sobel, Joel | 10/01/1985 | sswp565.pdf | |||
524 | Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control. | Banks, Jeffrey S. | 04/01/1984 | sswp524c.pdf | |||
523 | Price-Conveyed Information vs. Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence | Banks, Jeffrey S. | 03/01/1984 | 10 | sswp523.pdf | The recent experimental results of Plott and Sunder (1982) and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1983) on the ability of single commodity markets to :reveal" the underlying state to initially uninformed traders were potentially influenced by a design in which the set of informed traders was held constant throughout the life of the market. Hence the performance of uninformed traders in the market might have been predicated on their knowledge of, and the observed behavior of, the informed traders. The experiment discussed below is a replication of one market in Plott and Sunder (1982), with the added feature that the traders who were to be informed of the state differed from period to period. The results are equivalent to those of Plott and Sunder (1982) in the price dynamics, while less conclusive regarding the acquisition and use of the state-price correspondence by uninformed traders. |