Working Papers by Richard D. McKelvey
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1197 | Self-correcting Information Cascades | Goeree, Jacob K. Palfrey, Thomas R. Rogers, Brian W. McKelvey, Richard D. | 04/01/2004 | 41 pages | wp1197.pdf | In laboratory experiments, information cascades are ephemeral phenomena, collapsing soon after they form, and them reforming again. The formation/collapse/reformation cycles occur frequently and repeatedly. Cascades may be reversed (collapse followed by a cascade on a different state) and more often than not, such a reversal is self-correcting: The cascade switches from the incorrect to the correct state. Past experimental work focused on relatively short horizons, where these interesting dynamics are rarely observed. We present experiments with a longer horizon, and also investigate the effect of signal informativeness. We propose a theoretical model, based on quantal response equilibrium, where temporary and self-correcting cascades arise as equilibrium phenomena. The model also predicts the systematic differences we observe experimentally in the dynamics, as a function of signal informativeness. We extend the basic model to include a parameter measuring base rate neglect and find it to be a statistically significant factor in the dynamics, resulting in somewhat faster rates of social learning. | |
1056 | A Theory of Voting in Large Elections | McKelvey, Richard D. Patty, John W. | 02/01/1999 | sswp1056c.pdf | |||
1035 | Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An extension of the Myerson Satterthwaite Theorem with an application to the Coase Theorem | McKelvey, Richard D. Page, Talbot | 05/01/1998 | 24 pages | wp1035.pdf | We use a generalized version of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over trade of an indivisible good, where there is two sided private information on the valuations. We show that when preferences are convex and quasi linear, and when the private information represents the magnitude of the utility gain or loss and follows a uniform distribution, that the most efficient mechanism always exhibits a bias towards the status quo. In the case that utility functions are quadratic in the amount traded, we prove that for any incentive compatible direct mechanism, there is an expected bias towards the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. | |
1034 | An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions | McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 03/01/2000 | 53 pages | wp1034.pdf | We present experimental results on individual decisions in juries. We consider the effect of three treatment variables: the size of the jury (three or six), the number of votes needed for conviction (majority or unanimity), and jury deliberation. We find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule, where the form of strategic behavior involves a bias to vote guilty to compensate for the unanimity requirement. A large fraction of jurors vote to convict even when their private information indicates the defendant is more likely to be innocent than guilty. This is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (FP) [1998]. While individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model, at the level of the jury decision, there are numerous discrepancies. In particular, contrary to the FP prediction, we find that in our experiments juries convict fewer innocent defendants under unanimity rule than under majority rule. We are able to simultaneously account for the individual and group data by using Quantal Response Equilibrium to model the error. | |
1018 | An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem | McKelvey, Richard D. Page, Talbot | 09/01/1997 | sswp1018.pdf | |||
991 | The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2X2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria | Palfrey, Thomas R. McKelvey, Richard D. | 02/01/1999 | 35 pages | sswp991.pdf | The Logit version of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) predicts that equilibrium behavior in games will vary systematically with payoff magnitudes, if all other factors are held constant (including the Nash equilibria of the game). We explore this in the context of a set of asymmetric 2 x 2 games with unique totally mixed strategy equilibria. The data provide little support for the payoff magnitude predictions of the Logit Equilibrium model. We extend the theoretical QRE model to allow for heterogeneity, and find that the data fit the heterogeneous version of the theory significantly better. | |
955 | A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games | McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 02/01/1996 | 29 pages | sswp955c.pdf | This paper describes a statistical model of equiliobrium behaviour in games, which we call Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). The key feature of the equilibrium is that individuals do not always play responses to the strategies of their opponents, but play better strategies with higher probability than worse strategies. we illustrate several different applications of this approach, and establish a number of theoretical properties of this equilibrium concept. We also demonstrate an equililance between this equilibrium notion and Bayesian games derived from games of complete information with perturbed payoffs. | |
953 | A Laipunov Function for Nash Equilibria | McKelvey, Richard D. | 02/01/1998 | sswp953.pdf | |||
947 | Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games | McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 12/01/1995 | sswp947c.pdf | |||
883 | Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games | McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 03/01/1994 | sswp883c.pdf | |||
877 | An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games | Fey, Mark McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | sswp877c.pdf | ||||
876 | Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game | McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 01/01/1993 | ||||
865 | The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria | McKelvey, Richard D. McLennan, Andrew | 07/01/1994 | ||||
804 | The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information | McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | sswp804cover.pdf | ||||
803 | Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information | McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 08/01/1992 | sswp803.pdf | |||
780 | Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results. | Boylan, Richard T. Ledyard, John O. McKelvey, Richard D. | sswp780c.pdf | ||||
769 | Initial Versus Continuing Proposal Power in Legislative Seniority. | McKelvey, Richard D. Riezman, Raymond G. | 07/01/1991 | sswp769.pdf | |||
757 | A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games. | El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 08/01/1992 | sswp757c.pdf | |||
732 | An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game. | McKelvey, Richard D. Palfrey, Thomas R. | 08/01/1991 | sswp732.pdf | |||
725 | Seniority in Legislatures. | McKelvey, Richard D. Riezman, Raymond G. | 04/01/1990 | sswp725.pdf | |||
696 | Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling. | McKelvey, Richard D. Page, Talbot | 04/01/1989 | sswp696.pdf | |||
657 | A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees. | McKelvey, Richard D. Ordeshook, Peter C. | sswp657c.pdf | ||||
579 | Game Forms for Nash Implementation of General Social Choice Correspondences. | McKelvey, Richard D. | 08/01/1985 | sswp579.pdf | |||
563 | Optimal Research for Cournot Oligopolists. | Li, Lode McKelvey, Richard D. Page, Talbot | 02/01/1985 | sswp563.pdf | |||
552 | Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point. | McKelvey, Richard D. Schofield, Norman | 01/01/1985 | ||||
535 | Structural Instability of the Core. | McKelvey, Richard D. Schofield, Norman | 11/01/1984 | ||||
530 | Sequential Elections with Limited Information. | McKelvey, Richard D. Ordeshook, Peter C. | sswp530c.pdf | ||||
529 | Elections with Limited Information: A Multidimensional Model. | McKelvey, Richard D. Ordeshook, Peter C. | 07/22/2011 | sswp529c.pdf | |||
494 | Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice. | McKelvey, Richard D. | 05/01/1985 | sswp494.pdf | |||
493 | Common Knowledge and Consensus with Aggregate Statistics. | McKelvey, Richard D. Page, Talbot | 05/01/1984 | sswp493.pdf | |||
434 | Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources. | McKelvey, Richard D. Ordeshook, Peter C. | sswp434c.pdf | ||||
395 | Methods for Comparison of Markov Processes by Stochastic Dominance. | McKelvey, Richard D. Packel, Edward W. | 07/01/1981 | sswp395.pdf | |||
394 | Limiting Distributions for Continuous State Markov Voting Models. | Ferejohn, John A. McKelvey, Richard D. Packel, Edward W. | sswp394c.pdf | ||||
337 | A Ham Sandwich Theorem for General Measures. | Cox, Gary W. McKelvey, Richard D. | 06/20/2011 | sswp337c.pdf | |||
300 | Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions. | Ferejohn, John A. Grether, David M. McKelvey, Richard D. | sswp300c.pdf | ||||
264 | A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design. | McKelvey, Richard D. | 05/04/2011 | sswp264c.pdf | |||
260 | Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games. | McKelvey, Richard D. Ordeshook, Peter C. | 05/03/2011 | sswp260c.pdf | |||
252 | An Impossibility Theorem for Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions. | Ferejohn, John A. McKelvey, Richard D. | 04/14/2011 | sswp252.pdf | |||
231 | Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions. | McKelvey, Richard D. Ordeshook, Peter C. Ungar, Peter | sswp231c.pdf |