Working Papers by Ming Hsu
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
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1239 | Divergence and Convergence in Scarf Cycle Environments: Experiments and Predictability in the Dynamics of General Equilibrium Systems | Gillen, Benjamin J. Hirota, Masayoshi Hsu, Ming Plott, Charles R. Rogers, Brian W. | 10/01/2005 | 57 pages | sswp_1239_-_revised_v.2.pdf | Previous experimental work demonstrates the power of classical theories of economic dynamics to accurately characterize equilibration in multiple market systems. Building on the literature, this study examines the behavior of experimental continuous double auction markets in convergence-challenging environments identified by Scarf (1960) and Hirota (1981). The experiments provide insight into two important economic questions: (a) do markets necessarily converge to a unique interior equilibrium? and (b) which model, among a set of classical specifications, most accurately characterizes observed price dynamics? We observe excess demand driven prices spiraling outwardly away from the interior equilibrium prices as predicted by the theory of disequilibrium price dynamics. We estimate a structural model establishing that partial equilibrium dynamics characterize price changes even in an unstable general equilibrium environment. We observe linkages between excess demand in one market and price changes in another market but the sign of expected price change in a market does not depend on the magnitude of excess demand in other markets unless disequilibrium is severe. Original working paper published October 2005. | |
1198 | A Model of Elections with Spatial and Distributive Preferences | Hsu, Ming | 03/01/2004 | 32 pages | wp1198.pdf | This paper introduces a model where elections are games where voters have preferences over a public good (policy platforms) and a private good (transfers). The model produces the standard social choice results such as core convergence and policy separation. Furthermore, by introducing transfers, I am able to make more precise predictions about candidate locations and their dynamics than is possible under the standard spatial model. Another purpose of this paper lies in the creation of favored groups in elections. Ultimately, it is important to characterize political behavior while considering the different preferences that might exist in the constituents. By incorporating utility for private goods into standard utility assumptions, this model introduces these considerations into the standard spatial model, allowing us to have a richer and more nuanced look into elections. |