Working Papers by Jon X. Eguia
Showing 1 to 5 of 5 records.
# | Title | Authors | Date | Length | Paper | Abstract | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1257 | Voting blocs, coalitions and parties | Eguia, Jon X. | 11/01/2006 | 52 pages | sswp1257.pdf | ||
1234 | An explanation of inefficient redistribution: Transfers insure cohesive groups | Echenique, Federico Eguia, Jon X. | 08/01/2005 | 19 pages | wp1234.pdf | ||
1233 | Citizen candidates under uncertainty | Eguia, Jon X. | 08/01/2005 | 27 pages | wp1233.pdf | ||
1208 | United We Vote | Eguia, Jon X. | 12/01/2004 | 35 pages | wp1208.pdf | This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents in a larger electorate can obtain by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all in one direction. We show under which conditions an agent will benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, whether being part of it or stepping out is most advantageous for an individual agent and what are the different optimal internal voting rules to aggregate preferences within the coalition. | |
1176 | Is the Status Quo Relevant in a Representative Democracy? | Eguia, Jon X. | 09/01/2003 | 23 pages | sswp1176.pdf | This work studies the effect of the value of the status quo in the candidates' decisions and policy outcomes in a representative democracy with endogenous candidates. Following the citizen-candidate model due to Besley and Coate (1997) we show, for a unidimensional policy issue and for both an odd and even number of citizens, that some equilibria only hold for certain values of the status quo policy. In particular we find that a moderate status quo rules out equilibrium outcomes in which there is an uncontested candidate and that two-candidate equilibria exist more generally when the number of citizens is even. |